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try to distill our experience of this or that text as erotic rather than pornographic (or vice versa) into some general formula which holds true for all texts that the distinction seems to crumble, and we are forced to admit, somewhat shamefacedly, that any attempt to translate our phenomenal experience into a linguistic statement available for all will likely blur the edges of the distinction so drastically as to make it useless in practice if not in theory.
If anyone should be able to help us out of this predicament, then surely it is Roland
Barthes, who grappled with the erotic dimensions of reading under the slogan of the jouissance du texte, making clear that it can be an activity as intense as physical orgasm -yet an orgasm without ejaculation, without a fulfilling end. Barthes's thinking on this matter is of special significance because his writings have done so much to promote the wider conception of textuality that lies behind the contemporary textual approach to phenomena such as pornography. It would no doubt be a mistake to equate the generalized sense of textuality which is operable in the humanities and the social sciences today with Barthes's view of the Text as "a methodological field," yet there can be little doubt that the latter has played a pivotal role in preparing the way for the former. 7 Barthes's Text is essentially a roll-call for taking a semiotic approach to culture; its productivity to disciplines beyond literary studies derives from the fact that the idea of textuality has the strategic advantage "of cutting across both epistemology and the subject/object antithesis in such a way as to neutralize both, and of focusing the attention of the analyst on her own position as a reader and on her own mental operations as interpretation." 8 Much of Barthes's later work can be seen as a way of complicating this semiotic approach, in that it tirelessly reminds us of the erotic aspect of the expanded notion of the text that underlies his earlier ideological analyses. Signs, he explained in an interview with Bernard-Henri Lévy, "are only important to me if they seduce or irritate me. Signs in themselves are never enough for me, I must have the desire to read them." 9 Herein lies the unique contribution of Barthes to critical theory: that his unflinching attempt to Which brings me to my thesis, namely, that our inability to distinguish between the erotic and the pornographic derives not so much from a flaw in the distinction as such, as from the undertheorized nature of the very concept of textuality that critics have drawn on in the wake of Barthes and others. The concept of the text notably contains an inherent doubleness, which while well-known is all too seldom highlighted: the text designates both a linguistic entity, and our phenomenal experience of this entity. Adding to the confusion, it is far from clear whether it is the linguistic entity or our phenomenal experience of it that must be said to constitute the material aspect of the text -the answer varies from critic to critic, and at times, within the critical practice of individual critics. And yet the root of the confusion is not difficult to grasp: it is made up of the illegitimate (or, if you will, ideologically motivated) separation of the text from its mode of production, that is to say, of our division of what is in fact a continuous interpretive act into a series of discrete objects that we call the Writer, the Barthes briefly revisits in Camera Lucida, but of aesthetic evaluation as such. Once we understand why the distinction between the erotic and the pornographic can not be dismissed as the mere ideological reflex of the critic's own desire, we also will see why the ideological nature of aesthetic value judgments does not make them less indispensible for ideological analysis.
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The Story of Punctum Camera Lucida begins like a first-person novel: "One day, quite some time ago, I happened on a photograph of Napoleon's youngest brother, Jerome, taken in 1852." 17 Having spent much of his life as a critic getting away from the strictures of narrative, Barthes opens the book with a deliberately Proustian air, which is even more pronounced in the beginning of the second part of the book: "Now, one November evening shortly after my mother's death, I was going through some photographs" (CL, 63) -a sentence which is immediately followed by a quotation from Proust. 18 Adding to the novelistic flavor of the text, its argument is framed by the story-telling tense of the preterite. Both parts of the book notably begin with a series of sections (1-4, and 25-38, respectively) clearly set in the past tense we have learnt to associate with the narrative mode of fiction. While subsequent sections in both parts revert to the present tense that is more habitually employed in academic texts, the preterite briefly but significantly reappears about two thirds into both parts (sections 17 and 39), as well as at the very end, or close to it (24 and 47). From the very start of the book, then, the argument it proposes has already been situated as a story.
But then, Camera Lucida is not only an essay on photography, but also a highly personal work of mourning, in which Barthes presents his "discovery" of the nature of the photograph as a direct consequence of coming across a picture of his (recently deceased) mother as a child in a glassed-in conservatory, a Winter Garden. Barthes's interest in photography, however, begins at least two decades prior to his writing of Camera Lucida. What originally fascinates Barthes is that photography would seem to be a form of representation peculiar to itself in that a photo does not so much represent reality as simply present it. In contrast to all other forms of representation, photography would seem capable of communicating its content without having to resort to some kind of code: "In order to move from the reality to its photograph it is in no way necessary to divide up this reality into units and to constitute these units as signs, substantially different from the object they communicate; there is no necessity to set up a relay, that is to say a code, between the object and its image." 19 Camera Lucida returns to the uniqueness of the photograph at the very outset, yet in rather different terms. In this formulation, which occurs at the very beginning of the book, we have already the themes that Barthes will go on to explore: the singular nature of the relation between representation and represented in Photography, the realism (in the philosophical sense of the term) of the photo, which entails that there is in every photograph something that escapes the intention of the photographer, and by implication, the encounter with the Real (death).
In order to get at the peculiarity of the photo, Barthes sets about analyzing its various aspects. As to the communicative situation, Barthes distinguishes between the Spectator (viewer of the photo), the Operator (or photographer) and the Spectrum (the referent of the photo). The Spectrum is then further divided into two different versions, depending upon how it relates to, or rather, how it is phenomenologically experienced by, the Spectator. On the one hand, there is Spectrum as studium, the culturally connoted theme of the photo, so to speak, that which the photo is about, that which we find interesting in a photo, without being personally touched by it. Opposed to the studium, and Barthes's real interest in this essay, is the punctum, an element of the photograph -albeit by no means of all photographs, or so it will seem for a moment -that "will break (or punctuate) the studium. This time it is not I who seek it out (as I invest the field of the studium with my sovereign consciousness), it is this element which rises from the scene, shoots out like an arrow, and pierces me.
[…] A photograph's punctum is that accident which pricks me (but also bruises me, is poignant to me)" (CL, 27).
It may be well to note, already at this point, how deftly Barthes manipulates his description to fit his phenomenological experience of these matters. phenomenon, in other places he talks about language in very similar terms: "I am interested in language because it wounds or seduces me" 22 -much as he is interested in the photo insofar as it "pierces me" and leaves a "wound" (CL, 26). The line between the photo and the text in Barthes's thinking, then, is hardly a rigid one.
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The concept of punctum is considerably complicated over the course of the book in that it turns out that the initial definition of it is merely the first step toward a full understanding of the concept. As mentioned, the book comes in two halves, each of which is divided into twenty four sections. This symmetrical arrangement indicates the chiastic nature of the book's plot: in the first part of the book, Barthes discusses a heterogeneous series of photos which are "striped by a detail (punctum) which attracts or distresses me" (CL, 40); in the second part, he identifies a second, general sense of punctum -time -through a discussion of that very particular picture we have already mentioned, that of his mother as a child. It is crucial to observe, however, that Barthes's original definition takes the same form as his later expansion of the concept: in both cases, the explication takes the form of a narrative.
This circumstance is too often ignored in critical discussions of the concept. For obvious reasons, critics have been prone to associate punctum with visuality. "The punctum," Michael Fried typically suggests, "is seen by Barthes but not because it has been shown to him by the photographer […] ." 24 But the punctum of course is precisely not seen, but perceived. Indeed, contrary to what some of Barthes's formulations may seem to suggest, it is arguably not a visual phenomenon at all. Barthes admittedly sometimes writes as if the punctum were made up of this or that visual detail: his assertion that he was pricked by "the belt worn low by the sister (or daughter)" in James Van der Zee's picture of a family of American blacks, and in particular by "her strapped pumps" (CL, 43), is one such instance, his distinction between punctum and aberrant gesture another ("for me, the punctum is the other boy's crossed arms"
[CL, 51]), his discussion of the possibility to identify punctum retrospectively yet a third ("the real punctum was the necklace she was wearing" [CL, 53] ). Yet he is careful to point out that "what I can name cannot really prick me" (CL, 51), making evident that it cannot really be the details named that pricks him. This is so because the punctum is both "the element that rises from the scene and pierces me," and the wound made by this element; the details enumerated, however, are merely contingently related to this element. In some photos, "a 'detail' attracts me.
[…] This 'detail' is the punctum" (CL, 42); "Very often the Punctum is a 'detail,' i.e., a partial object" (CL, 43). As these formulations verify, Barthes does not identify punctum with a detail, but with a "detail" -when he uses the word without citation marks, the details no longer prick him, they "prick" him: "Certain details may 'prick'me" (CL, 47). If we attend to the letter of Barthes's text, then, it is quite clear that the relation between detail and punctum is of a figural order, that it is as if the details were the punctum.
Punctum, then, is not so much this or that detail that draws the viewer's attention, it is, rather, that within the situation of viewing the picture which awakens our very desire to speak of it all. The function of the details is simply to allow the critic to tell a story about that which cannot be named (the punctum). In this respect they are structurally identical to the Winter Garden Photograph in the second part, a point of no small interest in such an elegantly conceived story as that of Camera Lucida. Like the Winter Garden Photograph itself, these details are held up as so many objective correlates of a wound -or rather, a relation -that cannot be directly depicted.
Quite understandably, the peculiar circumstances surrounding the Winter Garden
Photograph have led a number of critics to look upon it as the punctum of Camera Lucida the very likelihood that the photograph has been planted would seem to rule out the suggestion that it forms a punctum; it would seem, rather, an accessory of studium connoting Literarity. The enduring theoretical significance of the book arguably comes out more clearly if we consider instead the implications of its comments on the distinction between the erotic and the pornographic.
The Non-Temporality of Pornography
In the first part of Camera Lucida, Barthes is quite clear on the essentially private character of the punctum: it is the quality of a photograph that surprises the Spectator -and this of course will vary upon who the Spectator is. Interestingly, Barthes goes on to argue that it is precisely the lack of such an element that accounts for the distinction between the pornographic photograph on the one hand, and the erotic on the other: "for me, there is no punctum in the pornographic image" (CL, 59). In the erotic image, by contrast, the punctum "is a kind of subtle beyond -as if the image launched desire beyond what it permits us to see: not only toward 'the rest' of the nakedness, not only toward the fantasy of a praxis, but toward the absolute excellence of a being, body and soul together." Whereas "the pornographic body
shows itself" but "does not give itself," the erotic photograph is marked by an air of generosity: "the photographer has found the right moment, the kairos of desire" (CL, 59).
Barthes's recourse to the concept of kairos makes evident that the punctum that the pornographic photo is said to lack is essentially of a temporal nature, that the "being" which Barthes finds inscribed into the erotic photo is a temporal being.
Stressing that the Winter Garden Photograph bears a punctum for him alone, Barthes in the second part of the essay goes on to identify another kind of punctum, not deriving from the detail that breaks out of the picture's studium and as it were draws our attention in spite of the photo's theme, but arising out of the very essence of the Photograph as such: "This new punctum, which is no longer of form but of intensity, is Time, the lacerating emphasis of the noeme ('that-has-been'), its pure representation" (CL, 96). This second form of punctum, then, is not so much of an affective as of a temporal or historical order. In effect, Barthes transposes affectivity -punctum in its singular form, that which makes the photo interesting for me -into history, and he does so by turning his analysis of the essence of the photo into a story. The narrative of Camera Lucida, to recapitulate, moves from a discussion of the photograph as a culturally coded studium broken by a punctum -a concept which in turn is divided into two by the intervention of a story ("Now, one November evening shortly after my mother's death…"; CL, 63) -to reach at the end "the very letter of Time" (CL, 119). Barthes's transposition of the affective into the historical thus allows him to read not only individual photographs, but the Photograph as such, and gives him the critical leverage to critique the ideological nature of the studium. For veiled beneath the triviality and sheer mass of photographs in present society, punctum in the general sense Barthes arrives at by telling it as a story, is an ingredient of every photograph: "It is because each photograph always contains this imperious sign of my future death that each one, however attached it seems to be to the excited world of the living, challenges each of us, one by one, outside of any generality (but not outside any transcendence)" (CL, 97; my emphasis). Hidden behind the readerly layer of the studium of the photographic text lies a writerly punctum, an aspect of the text that is not there to be read but which can always be produced by being written.
Or at least, punctum ought to be a component of every photograph. We remember, however, that Barthes has already declared that "there is no punctum in the pornographic image." It is true that this statement refers to a less general form of punctum -but we have also already seen that Barthes distinguishes between the erotic and the pornographic photo on temporal grounds, on account of the former presenting "the right moment, the kairos of desire." Barthes does not turn back and say that the pornographic photo lacks the general form of punctum as well in so many words; but he does suggest, in conclusion, that pornography is one of the means by which society tames the photograph by invoking the tableaux vivants to be found in "a New York porn shop" (CL, 118).
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We have every reason, however, to reverse Barthes's suggestions about the pornographic photo on one crucial account: we should grant that it may very well be the experience of having been drawn into the photograph by the presence of a punctum in the form of this or that odd detail, of being surprised into desire by some indefinable look in the model's face or posture, that makes people prone to go back to pornography again and again despite knowing full well in advance that they are unlikely to find anything new therein. What pornography lacks -at least, so it seems for me -is not necessarily punctum in the form of such piercing details, but precisely the generalized form of punctum as time. Not that this temporal dimension is not there -as its producers often point out, the principal attraction of pornography is its indexical indubitability, that what is depicted is not sex represented but sex presented. But in pornographic pictures, the intervention of the masturbatory response it is designed to elicit turns the photographic noeme of "that-has-been" into the very different impression of "this-is." The punctum as time is there all right, but it is also immediately consumed, that is, it does not survive the act of reading.
Usually, when we read -and it should be noted that Barthes himself is prone to use the verb "read" rather than "view" in relation to photographs -we ascribe significance to the text:
the office of the reader could be said to be that of producing the allegorical meaning of the 
The Situation of the Text
As the above discussion has shown, in separating a good eroticism from a bad pornography Barthes seemingly retains the conventional evaluative implication of the distinction. I have been at pains to show, however, that Barthes's seemingly offhand treatment of the two terms does not so much buy into this evaluation, as expose its underlying premise, namely that eroticism is considered good because it allows us to tell the story of our own engagement in the work at hand, whereas pornography in contrast denies us this potential for narrative bliss in offering us the prospect of a moment of pleasure to be immediately consumed. The distinction between pornography and erotica, Barthes suggests, is based upon what kind of stories the discourse in question allow us -or force us -to tell.
As we have seen, pornography on Barthes's analysis contains no punctum; that is to say, it forms a story in which there is no temporal distance between the reader (or user) and the tale.
This lack of distance between tale and reading is precisely what accounts for the attraction of pornography, but also for the revulsion against it. To follow the psychoanalytic drift of Barthes's essay, we could say that the erotic and the pornographic reflect respectively a Symbolic and an Imaginary conception of the subject. Whilst the erotic discourse enforces a distance between the subject and the narrative s/he partakes of, pornography is premised on the imaginary -that is to say, masturbatory -identification of reader/viewer and narrative.
Being of an imaginary rather than symbolic order, the letter of the pornographic discourse is suppressed, to the effect that its signified is consumed rather than produced, thus suspending its textual character. Spectator to the Spectrum; that the precise nature of that link always remains to be specifiedas we have seen, it can be told as a story only after having instilled a wound -makes evident that we are dealing with the human temporality of psychoanalysis rather than the divine one of religion. In human temporality, psychoanalytic practice demonstrates, the past remains present because everything that happens to us lives on in our bodies. While our experiences may be more or less violently repressed or simply quietly embedded amongst those things we don't think about anymore because they seem to us so ordinary as to lack any real significance, they are always liable to make themselves felt again, as is suggested by Proust's madeleine no less than Freud's symptom.
In constituting such a historical wound through its very form (that-has-been), the photograph as analyzed by Barthes ought always to remind us of the presence of death in life, and should thus ceaselessly call to mind the material conditions of existence. As the general function of photography is in fact if anything the very opposite of this, we can only conclude that our society has found some way of repressing the link between photography and death.
That, at any rate, would seem to be the point at which Camera Lucida arrives: the tableux vivants of the "New York porn shop" he evokes in the book's last section suggests that pornography and pornographic excitement is a means to such a repression. And yet, as we have seen, Barthes's distinction between the erotic and pornographic is clearly not of an evaluative order: the pornographic image is distinguished from the erotic one not because it is less aesthetically satisfying or morally more distasteful than the latter, but simply because it lacks a temporal dimension the erotic image openly displays. Indeed, the distinction between the erotic and the pornographic in Camera Lucida is no less unstable than that between punctum and studium. Just as punctum begins as an aberrant detail, perceivable only in some photographs, but becomes in the latter half of the book a universal trait of photographs, the function of censoring the punctum which at first is expressly associated only with the pornographic photo, in the final pages of Camera Lucida seems a general feature of photography. The pornographic, in other words, no longer seems a quality of specific texts (pornographic photos); the very situation of consumer society deserves to be labeled pornographic.
Notwithstanding the productiveness of conceding the Textuality of culture, there is, then, a certain incommensurability between contemporary Cultural Studies and the consumer culture often studied, for while the former persists in studying the allegorical sense at the center of ideologies of the Text such as semiotics, the principal ideological feature of the latter would seem to be that it has found an affective mechanism for dispensing with allegory altogether. On the contrary, to dismiss that desire as ideological (in a negative sense) is in effect to accept as given a critical position from which culture can be studied only as studium, as an allegorical and ideological sense which no longer turns inwards toward our own deepest desires -it is to study culture as a narrative space exempt of utopian possibilities. For an important articulation of utopia surely is the hope that my desires may coincide with those of my fellow human beings, the hope that henceforth whatever I do for me will also serve the best interest of all, and that whatever is done for all will also be in the best interest of me.
Rather than reject aesthetic evaluation because of its inescapably ideological nature, then, we should evolve a critical vocabulary that allows us to articulate the principles underlining the operation by which we would have a sense of what the text means for me turn into a sense for all. Reading social and historical phenomena as a text should thus at most be seen as a first preliminary step for cultural criticism. While such a procedure prevents us from succumbing to the illusion of the autonomy of art enforced by the artistic Work, it is liable to make us give in to an ideological assumption of another kind. It is all too easy to assume that because the ideological dimension of the text will always be circumscribed by the historical situation in which it is read, the text itself must also always already be ideological, when in fact it is more accurately described as neutral. Neutrality is something very different from autonomy: it means merely that the text as such will never align itself with any party, but will suffer itself to be used by one and all. view of the photographic image as the "perfect analogon" to reality itself merely shows the "common sense" definition of the photograph, which "has every chance of being mythical" (17). In truth, the photograph does not only denote reality, it connotes a view or attitude towards the depicted content. Like any other sign system, then, the photograph comprises two levels of enunciation, that of denotation and that of connotation. It is unique, not because it alone amongst forms of representation escapes the semiotic realm of textuality, but because 27 Barthes admits as much in the book itself: "Once she was dead I no longer had any reason to attune myself to the progress of the superior Life Force (the race, the species). My particularity could never again universalize itself (unless, utopically, by writing, whose project henceforth would become the unique goal of my life)" (CL, 72).
28 For a discussion of Barthes's view on erotic desire is influenced by his homosexuality, see
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